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Abstract
In 1995, the Swedish government reformed the parental leave sys-
tem with the view to increase the share of fathers in child care, change
gender roles in society, and improve the chances of mothers in the la-
bor market. We investigate a unique data set comprising the entire
population of Swedish children born in a span of two weeks before
and two weeks after the reform. The reform constitutes a natural ex-
periment. Comparing two cohorts of a total of 7600 newborns, their
mothers, and fathers over a period of eight years, we look at a) the
number of days mothers and fathers take parental leave and b) the
number of days for care of sick children. We ﬁnd that the reform had
as t r o n gs h o r t - t e r me ect on parental leave by fathers, but that there
are no long-run eects on fathers’ willingness to increase their part in
care for sick children.
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Sweden is famous for its generous welfare system and its attempts to provide
women with equal opportunities. The parental leave system in Sweden pro-
vides generous support for parents staying at home with their young children;
they are entitled to more than one year of parental leave at a replacement
rate of 80% of their prior earnings. In contrast to many other countries
(Ruhm, 1998, and Ruhm and Teague, 1997), the same rules apply for fathers
and mothers in the Swedish system. Nonetheless, women take the bulk of
the parental leave. In 1995, the Swedish government introduced a reform,
the “Daddy-month”, which reserved at least one month of the total parental
leave available per child for the father. The Government believed that the
reform would incite fathers to spend more time with their children in the ﬁrst
years of their lives. It also expected the reform to increase fathers’ shares in
child care in the long run, contributing to long-run improvements in gender
roles and more equal labor market outcomes:
“It is important that fathers take parental leave. An increased
use of parental leave by fathers should contribute to a change in
attitudes among managers; they will view parental leave as some-
thing natural to consider when planning and organizing the work.
This change in attitudes is necessary for both men and women to
dare to take parental leave without a feeling of jeopardizing their
career or development opportunities at work. Another reason for
increasing fathers’ use of parental leave is that women’s prospects
of achieving equal opportunities to men in the labor market will
be limited, as long as women are responsible for practical house-
work and children. A shared responsibility for the practical care
of children would mean a more even distribution of interruptions
in work between women and men, and women would thereby gain
better opportunities of development and making a career in their
profession.” From the Government Proposition 1993/94:147 to
the Swedish Parliament, translation by the authors.
The economic rationale behind this Government Proposition was: First,
more parental leave by fathers ought to reduce the scope of discrimination.
(For references to economic studies on gender discrimination, see Altonji and
Blank, 1999). Second, it should lead to less specialization of female human
capital into household and child care work, a rationale related to Becker’s
theories of human capital and the family (Becker 1965, 1981). Third, more
parental leave by fathers should improve the trade-o faced by ﬁrms when
2hiring: Firms may be inclined to hire men rather than women, because men
a r el e s so f t e na b s e n tt ot a k ec a r eo fc h i l d r e n . W h i l et h eﬁ r md o e sn o tp a y
the cost of leave for sick children, work disruptions are costly for ﬁrms.1
We investigate whether the Swedish government was right about the
short- and long-term eects of the reform, using a unique data set com-
prising all children born in Sweden around the time of the reform. These
pre- and post-reform cohorts of newborns and their parents are followed over
a period of eight years, with 3700 children in the before cohort and 3900 in
the after cohort. In a nutshell, we ﬁnd that the Swedish government was
right about the short-term eects of the reform. Fathers in the post-reform
cohort, on average, increase their parental leave by 15 days. The percent-
age of fathers using zero days of parental leave decreases substantially, while
there is a large increase in fathers taking about one month of parental leave.
To look at long-run eects, we use data on a second social beneﬁt provided
independently of parental leave: Fathers and mothers can take paid leave for
t h ec a r eo fs i c kc h i l d r e nu pt ot h ea g eo ft w e l v ey e a r s . I fi tw e r et h ec a s e
that an increase in father’s parental leave induced fathers to acquire more
and mothers less human capital for the care of children, then, an increase in
fathers’ shares of care for sick children should be observed in the post-reform
cohort. However, the data does not indicate any long-term eect of more
parental leave on the allocation of care for sick children. Thus, it appears
that the purported link between parental leave and shared responsibility for
children does not exist or that the eect of the reform was too weak to have
signiﬁcant eects.
In general, it is very di!cult to evaluate the success of reforms in so-
cial beneﬁt systems, but our data provides a unique opportunity: First, the
data is registry data of the institutions paying the beneﬁt, rather than self-
reported. Second, we are not studying a sample, but the entire population
o fc h i l d r e nb o r ni nS w e d e ni nag i v e np e r i o do ft i m e : T h ec o n t r o lg r o u p
comprises all newborns in Sweden in the two weeks before the reform was
implemented (1st January, 1995), and the treatment group comprises all
newborns in a span of two weeks after. Third, and most importantly, the
data stems from a clean natural experiment. The exact birth date of a child
is the outcome of a random process and the parents’ inﬂuence is only mar-
ginal.2 Thus, we avoid the potential problem of omitted variables, which
would make it impossible to distinguish the eects of the reform from cor-
related inﬂuences. As the reform induces an exogenous increase in parental
1Finally, the government stressed that a close and early contact between father and
child was beneﬁcial for psychological reasons. Evaluating this possible beneﬁt of the reform
goes beyond the scope of this paper.
2This issue is discussed in Section 4.
3leave, any potentially observed long-run behavioral changes of parents in the
treatment cohorts should be due to the reform.
The outline of the paper is as follows: The next section provides some
background to the Swedish beneﬁt systems for the care of sick children and
parental leave and the daddy-month reform. Section 3 describes the data.
Section 4 discusses the properties of our data and motivates the use of the
natural experiment approach. The eects of the reform are analyzed in Sec-
tion 5. Section 6 discusses the results against economic theory and concludes.
2B a c k g r o u n d
2.1 Parental Leave Prior to Reform
In most OECD countries, there is a tendency to increase the beneﬁts given
to families. While the bulk of beneﬁts was initially given to mothers, many
countries now try to move away from traditional gender roles (Ferrarini,
2003). Hence, family beneﬁts are now often designed in such a way as to
increase the responsibility of fathers for child care, and the labor market
opportunities of mothers. As early as in 1974, the Swedish maternity-leave
system was changed to a parental-leave system, where the same rules apply
to fathers and mothers. In the ﬁrst year after the reform, men only used
0.5 percent of the parental leave. By 1994, this ﬁgure had increased to 11.4
percent. The determinants of fathers use of parental leave have been studied
by Sundström and Duvander (2002), but our paper is the ﬁrst to evaluate the
daddy-month reform. Parents are compensated in relation to their earnings
for 360 days and the reimbursement rate varies between 75 and 80 percent
for the period studied, see Table 1. There was a bonus of 10 percent for the
ﬁrst month of parental leave in the ﬁrst two years after the reform.
The reimbursement rate is based on prior earnings for the ﬁrst year after
the child was born, and then on an estimate of the wage the parent would
get when returning to work. Thus, the compensation will increase after one
year, if the wages in the parent’s profession have increased during the ﬁrst
year of parental leave. The compensation is limited by a ceiling, in our data
12 percent of the fathers and 4 percent of the mothers hit the ceiling at the
time of the daddy-month reform. Parents are also compensated at a low
ﬂat rate of 60 SEK/day (approximately USD 8) for 90 days and parents
without earnings are also compensated at this level for the 360 days when
compensation is based on earnings. The parental leave must be used before
the child turns eight or ﬁnishes ﬁrst grade in school, but more than 90 percent
of the leave are used during the ﬁrst two years of the child’s life. Only one
4parent is allowed to use parental leave at a time, but they can both work part
time and use parental leave part time as long as the total parental leave does
not exceed full time. Finally, in a separate system, fathers are entitled to 10
days of beneﬁts in connection with the birth, which can be used although the
mother is on parental leave. These ten days must be used during the ﬁrst 60
days after the birth of the child.
Table 1: Reimbursement rates (in percent) in the
Parental Leave System 1993-2003.













2.2 The Daddy-Month Reform
One month is reserved for each of the parents for children born after January
1, 1995. Almost all mothers used at least one month of parental leave before
the reform, so in practice, the restriction on the division of parental leave
is only binding for fathers, and the month reserved is generally known as
the daddy-month. About 30 percent of the fathers used at least one month
of parental leave before the reform, about 40 percent increased their use to
one month, and about 30 percent used little or no parental leave after the
reform. The introduction of the daddy-month coincided with a decrease in
the reimbursement level from 90 to 80 percent, a change which aected both
groups in the same way.3
3From the ﬁrst of January 2002, parents are entitled to 390 days of parental leave with
t w om o n t h sr e s e r v e df o re a c hp a r e n t .T h i sd o e sn o ta ect the parental leave for children
born under the period studied.
52.3 Care for Sick Children
Parents are entitled to government paid time-out due to care for sick children
until the age of twelve. The reimbursement is based on current earnings and
the replacement rate varies between 75 and 80 percent for the period studied.
Parents can beneﬁt from this system up to 60 days a year. Men account for
approximately one third of the leave for care of sick children. The share of
children cared for by any of their parents on at least one occasion during a
year peaks at 65 percent for two-year old children and then gradually declines
(RFV, 2002). The average share of children cared for on at least one occasion
during a year is about 50%. The average number of days of care by those
parents using the system is six for men and seven for women. The data
on the care of sick children has the advantage of not being self-reported.
The government pays for the beneﬁt, but the employers may incur indirect
costs from the worker’s absence. The uneven distribution between genders
as concerns care for sick children aects the employers more directly than
most other dierences in the distribution of household work.
3D a t a
To construct the cohorts of parents entitled to beneﬁts from the parental
leave system analyzed in this paper, we restrict our attention to parents of
children born two weeks (14 days) before and after the reform. Hence, only
data for children born between December 18, 1994 and January 14, 1995 will
be included. Two cohorts (called the before and after cohorts below) are
constructed from population data collected by the Swedish National Social
Insurance Board (Riksförsäkringsverket). The data is assembled from records
obtained from local insurance o!ces, and covers all parental leave taken
between the years 1993-2003. The data contains information on geographical
location, the starting date of the parental leave and the extent of days (in
shares if not a full day), the amount of the parent’s cash beneﬁt, and gender
and date of birth for both the child and the parent. To access information
for a child or parent, at least one withdrawal must be observed between the
quarters 1994:4 and 2003:2, otherwise this information will be censored. As
seen in Table 2, almost all mothers used at least some parental leave in both
cohorts.
6Table 2: Number of Observations and Frequency Ob-
served in Cohorts Two Weeks before and after the Re-
form.
Sample Before After
O b sF r e q .O b sF r e q .
Children 3709 3892
Fathers 3134 84.5% 3467 89.1%
Mothers 3676 99.1% 3866 99.3%
Both parents 3101 83.6% 3441 88.4%
T h ec o h o r ts i z ei sa b o u t5p e r c e n tl a r g e ra f t e rt h a nb e f o r et h er e f o r m .
However, the number of fathers observed in the data increases by about 11
percent. For comparison, results from a reference group of all children born
in the quarters 1994:4 and 1995:1 will be reported. Table 10 in the Appendix,
shows the number of observations in the reference group. The increase in the
proportion of observed fathers is about the same for the reference group, as
for the two weeks cohorts.
4A n a t u r a l e x p e r i m e n t
The time of conception cannot be completely controlled by the parents. Even
after conception, the exact birth date of a child is the outcome of a random
process. Since the lapse of time for a pregnancy can be regarded as normally
distributed with a mean of 40 weeks and a standard deviation of 2 weeks4,
we have a natural experiment in its cleanest sense, a so-called ’natural’ nat-
ural experiment (see Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000) when we compare the
behavior of parents with children born immediately before and after the re-
form. This means that we avoid the potential problem of omitted variables.
Fathers’ parental leave and their care for sick children are likely to be corre-
lated for a number of reasons. For example, fathers with a traditional view
on gender roles, or with managers with a traditional view, and fathers with
jobs where absences cause large problems will all be less likely both to take
parental leave and care for sick children. Hence, it is impossible to determine
the causal eect of parental leave on care for sick children, unless all these
eects can be controlled for. The natural experiment approach avoids this
problem, as we have an exogenous change in fathers’ parental leave due to
the daddy-month reform. For the natural experiment approach to be valid,
4In principle, the birth date of the child cannot be postponed, but it is possible to
hasten the birth.
7there must not be any systematical dierences between the characteristics of
the two cohorts. Below, we show some data to conﬁrm that this in fact the
case.
Figure 1 presents the distribution of the number of children born per day,
under the observed periods. The two periods are marked with thin vertical
























Figure 1. Distribution of Births October 1994 - March 1995.
Figure 1 shows that there are large seasonal dierences over time; however,
no signs are found of there being any irregular patterns around the turn of
years. There is a common pattern that the number of children born in Sweden
in a two-week period after the turn of the year is larger than the number of
children in the corresponding period before the New Year. This can be seen in
Table 11 in the Appendix. To further investigate any systematic dierences
between the two cohorts, we compare the parents’ age distributions, and the
distributions of births by county.
Table 3: Age Distributions of Mothers and Fathers, be-
fore and after the Reform.
Before After
Mean age std Mean age std
Fathers 32.00 6.04 31.93 5.96
Mothers 29.17 5.05 29.08 5.14
8As seen in Table 3, there are small dierences in the age distribution
between the samples. A t-test assesses that there is no statistically signiﬁcant
dierence in the mean age between the before and after reform parents. Note
that important background variables such as level of education and income
are positively correlated with the parents’ age. A dierence between the
parents of the before and after cohort in any of these variables would have
s h o w nu pi nad i erence in age. This argument may not hold for fathers, as
there is missing data on age for a substantial fraction of fathers, but we have
age data for over 99 percent of the mothers. The age of the mother and the
father is strongly correlated, so a sample selection problem for fathers on, for
example, education would show up in an age dierence also for the mother.
We have data on the geographical distribution of births and ﬁnd no sys-
tematic dierences between the cohorts in this respect either. As seen in
Table 12 in the Appendix, the number of births in the Stockholm County
is equally distributed around 800, both before and after the reform. Small
increases subsequent to the reform can be found in the counties of Östergöt-
land, Skåne and Gävleborg, otherwise the dierences are small. To sum up,
there is, ap r i o r i ,very unlikely to be a systematic dierence in the charac-
teristics of parents in the before and after cohort, and we do not see any
evidence of systematic dierences in the data.
5E ects of the Reform
In this section, we will ﬁrst study the eects of the reform on fathers’ use of
parental leave, and then investigate if the reform had any long-run eects on
fathers’ share of care for sick children.
5.1 Parental Leave
As shown in the previous section, we have not been able to ﬁnd any systematic
dierence in the composition of the two cohorts of children born two weeks
before and two weeks after the reform. Hence, any dierence in fathers’ use
of parental leave should be an eect of the reform. A ﬁrst step in analyzing
this is to compare the mean of parental leave days, for the 360 days when
compensation is based on earnings and the additional 90 days when it is
based on ﬂat rate.
9Table 4: Mean of Parental Leave Days in the Cohorts
Two Weeks before and after the Reform.
Sample Before After
Mean Std Mean Std Mean-di t-stat
Fathers:
360-days 29.5 61.9 44.2 57.4 14.7 10.8
90-ﬂat 8.0 21.1 9.3 21.8 1.4 2.8
Mothers:
360-days 323.7 87.3 298.9 80.5 -24.7 -12.8
90-ﬂat 59.9 42.8 63.1 44.0 3.2 3.2
From Table 4, it can be seen that fathers increase their parental leave by
about 15 days on average. The increase should be below the 30 days reserved
for fathers by the daddy-month reform. Some fathers didn’t use there daddy-
month and some fathers would have used parental leave without the reform,
and would thus not increase their parental leave by 30 days. The number
of days used by mothers decrease more than they do increase for fathers,
which is also expected, since some fathers do not use the days redistributed
from mothers to fathers by the daddy-month reform. There is an increase in
mothers use of the 90-ﬂat system, which could be interpreted as some mothers
use this less beneﬁcial system when their access to the more beneﬁcial 360-
days system is reduced. Fathers increase in the use of 90-ﬂat system is harder
to explain. If we look at the three months cohort the increase is reduced to
0.5 days, however. The t-ratio shows there to be a statistically signiﬁcant
dierence in the means of parental leave days between the before and after
reform parents. The results for the 360 days system are not sensitive to the
cohort size chosen and the dierences between cohort sizes in the use of the
90 ﬂat system is small. We have experimented with cohorts between ten days
and three months before and after the reform and we report some data for
the three month before and after cohorts in Table 13 in the Appendix. In
total, the use of the 360-days system decreases by 10 days after the reform,
and total parental leave for both systems decreases by 5 days.
10Table 5: Distribution of Fathers’ Parental Leave (360-
Days System).
Number Before After Dierence
of days Freq. Percent Freq. Percent (Aft-Bef)
0 days 1993 53.7 689 17.7 -36.0
0 - 10 396 10.7 171 4.4 -6.3
10 - 20 207 5.6 215 5.5 -0.1
20 - 30 205 5.5 1333 34.3 28.7
30 - 40 139 3.7 482 12.4 8.6
40 - 50 102 2.8 184 4.7 2.0
5 0 - 6 0 7 92 . 1 1 1 32 . 9 0 . 8
60 - 70 77 2.1 95 2.4 0.4
70 - 80 56 1.5 68 1.8 0.2
80 - 90 57 1.5 71 1.8 0.3
90 - 100 42 1.1 48 1.2 0.1
100> 356 9.6 423 10.9 1.3
F r o mT a b l e5 ,i ti sc l e a rt h a tt h em a s si nt h ed i s t r i b u t i o ni ss h i f t e df r o m
zero days before the reform, towards an interval of around 30 days after
the reform. The fraction at zero days is reduced by 36 percentage points,
and the fraction in the interval between 20 and 40 days increased by 38
percentage points. Moreover, the reform seemed to have no eect at all on
t h ed i s t r i b u t i o no f6 0d a y so rm o r e . T h em e a ni n c r e a s ei nf a t h e r s ’u s eo f

























Figure 2. Mean Increase in Fathers’ Use of Parental Leave by Year.
From Figure 2, it can be seen that about 50 percent of the increase can be
attributed to the ﬁrst two years after the birth, the rest are evenly distributed
during the 1997 to 2001 year, followed by a somewhat larger increase in 2002.
The increase the last year may be due to that parental leave has to be used
before the child turns eight. For children over the age of two, a larger part of
parental leave is used during the months of July, August and December, both
for fathers and mothers, and in both the before and after cohorts. A closer
inspection of the results in Figure 2 reveals that the increase in parental leave
by fathers, for children over the age of two, to a large extent is attributed to
an increases of days used in these months.
5.2 Fathers’ Share of Care for Sick Children
In this section, we investigate if the increase in fathers’ use of parental leave
made them take larger responsibility for the care of sick children. The distri-
bution of care for sick children shows a large variation over season and age































































































































































































Figure 3. Fraction of Sick Children Per Day (Before Reform Cohort).
The division between parents of the care for sick children is usually not
a zero or one decision, since most children are sick on several occasions.
The decision of which of the parents should stay at home with a sick child
on a certain occasion depends on the problems caused at the workplace by
an absence, which could vary from day to day. The (dis-)satisfaction from
working could also vary between days. From the data, we know that most
parents are in an interior solution where the father has a positive share of
care for sick children. The main testable prediction from theory is that
increased human capital in housework and child care after the introduction
of the daddy-month should lead to a higher share of care for sick children
by fathers’ in the after group. We use two measures for fathers’ share of
care for sick children. A) MALESHARE, the mean of the share of care
taken by fathers, calculated as the number of days by the father divided
by the number of days taken by both parents in the family. This variable
is restricted between 0 and 1 for each child. B) We also look at the total
number of days taken by fathers, divided by the total number of days taken
by the parents. The results for measure A are given in Table 6 and the results
for measure B are given in Table 7.
13Table 6: Mean of Fathers’ Share (in Percent) of Care for
Sick Children Days, in Samples Two Weeks before and
after the Reform.
Sample Before After
Mean Std Mean Std Mean-di t-stat
Fathers’
share: 35.04 32.02 35.52 32.35 0.47 0.60
As seen in Table 6, there is a 0.47 percentage point dierence in the means
of fathers’ share of care for sick children. A t-test assesses that there is no
statistically signiﬁcant dierence in the means between the before and after
reform cohorts. Using measure B, we instead obtain a small negative eect
of the reform on fathers’ use of parental leave for the two week cohorts, but
looking at a larger cohort, such as the three-month cohort in Table 7, we ﬁnd
no dierence at all.
Table 7: Fathers’ Share of the Total Number of Care for
Sick Child Days.
Two weeks Three months
Before After Percent Before After Percent
Year share share change share share change
1995 48.44 38.12 -10.32 49.92 38.01 -11.91
1996 35.01 35.32 0.30 35.25 36.26 1.02
1997 34.32 33.76 -0.57 33.76 33.80 -0.04
1998 35.44 33.83 -1.62 34.04 34.92 0.89
1999 34.16 34.43 0.26 34.54 35.28 0.74
2000 33.77 34.63 0.86 33.17 34.10 0.93
2001 33.12 32.64 -0.48 33.30 33.48 0.19
2002 30.98 31.97 0.99 31.64 32.69 1.05
2003 33.07 na
Total 34.60 34.15 -0.45 34.58 34.60 0.02
(1994-2003)
We observe a decrease in fathers’ share of care for sick children for the
ﬁrst year, before the child turns one. However, the number of days of care for
sick children is low during the ﬁrst year, because most children are already
cared for by a parent on parental leave. For older children, we only see small
changes, with mixed signs for dierent years, in the fathers’ use of care for
sick children. This pattern is stable to changes in cohort size, see Table 8.
14Table 8: Fathers’ Share of Care for Sick Children for
dierent Cohort Sizes.
Cohorts 2 weeks 1 Month
Before After Di Before After Di
(1) MALESHARE 35.04 35.52 0.47 35.19 35.57 0.38
(0.60) (0.72)
(2) Men’s share of 34.60 34.15 -0.45 34.70 34.67 -0.03
total number of days
N. of obs. 3226 3427 7168 7788
Cohorts 2M o n t h s 3M o n t h s
Before After Di Before After Di
(1) MALESHARE 34.98 35.33 0.36 34.93 35.44 0.51
(0.95) (1.71)
(2) Men’s share of 34.50 34.52 0.02 34.58 34.60 0.02
totalnumber of days
N. of obs. 14182 15595 21561 24500
We face a trade o for sample sizes. A small sample results in a very
clean natural experiment while a large sample increases the e!ciency of the
estimates, but makes the natural experiment less clean. In the table above,
we show the results for cohort sizes between two weeks and three months.
For the two-week sample, there is only a 28-day dierence in age between
the ﬁrst child in the before group and the last child in the after group. For
the three-month sample, there is a six-month age dierence between the ﬁrst
and the last child, making it a less clean natural experiment. In row (1),
we measure fathers’ share of care for sick children as their mean share of
care for sick children, MALESHARE. There is no signiﬁcant dierence in
MALESHARE for any of the cohort sizes. In row (2), fathers’ share of care
for sick children is measured as fathers’ share of the total number of days of
care for sick children. The results for this measure are very similar to those
for MALESHARE. The magnitude of fathers’ share of care for sick children
is almost the same, and the dierence between the before and after groups
is small. There are no t-statistics for the dierence for this measure, but the
magnitude of the dierences are very small, smaller than the insigniﬁcant
dierences for the variable MALESHARE.
15C h i l d r e nb o r ni nd i erent years are treated dierently in some respects.
For example do children who are born in December 1994 start school one
year before children born in January 1995. This could potentially lead to a
turn of the year eect on the use of parental leave and care for sick children.
T a b l e9s h o w st h ed i erence between before and after samples in fathers’ use
of parental leave and care for sick children. Care for sick children is measured
by MALESHARE and by fathers share of total number of days for care for
sick children (CSC).
Table 9: Dierences Around the Turn of Years.
Days of men’s MALESHARE Men’s share
parental leave CSC percentage
Cohort 2 weeks 3 months 2 weeks 3 months 2 weeks 3 months
1995-96 -1.07 0.98** -2.08** 0.06 -0.92 -0.20
(-0.80) (2.00) (-2.46) (0.20)
1996-97 0.45 0.13 0.04 0.15 -0.02 0.52
(0.32) (0.27) (0.05) (0.43)
1997-98 0.59 -0.48 1.83** 0.15 1.77 0.15
(0.45) (-0.93) (1.99) (0.43)
1998-99 2.29* 0.55 0.41 0.22 -0.87 0.44
(1.67) (1.06) (0.42) (0.61)
1999-00 -3.02** 0.47 -0.47 -0.15 -2.15 -0.34
(-2.12) (-0.92) (-0.44) (-0.39)
2000-01 -0.49 0.33 2.21** -0.28 -0.22 -0.64
(-0.36) (0.65) (1.98) (-0.66)
Note. Variables with *** are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, with
** at the 5 percent level and with * at the 10 percent level.
T h e r ei sn os y s t e m a t i cd i erence between the before and after cohorts.
For the three month cohorts we ﬁnd no systematic pattern of signiﬁcant
eects for the turn of the year. The signiﬁcant eects in the 2 weeks cohorts
for some years are of dierent signs for dierent years, so there is not a
consistent pattern of any turn of the year eects.
Finally, we turn to the relation between fathers’ use of parental leave
and their share of care for sick children. In Figure 6, we see that there is a
strongly positive relation between fathers’ parental leave and their share of
care for sick children. This correlation is not causal, as an exogenous increase
in fathers’ parental leave did not aect their share of care for sick children.
The design of the reform allows us to distinguish between the causal eects
of parental leave to care for sick children from omitted variables for which
16it would be hard to obtain good data, such as satisfaction at work, values
held by fathers and mothers, and long-run costs of absences from work in the

















Figure 6. Fathers’ Share of Care for Sick Children by Parental Leave Days.
Fathers’ mean share of care for sick children essentially remains unchanged.
The dierence between the before and after group is explained by composi-
tional eects. Note that the behavior of fathers taking more that 40 days of
parental leave is not changed by the reform.
6C o n c l u s i o n
A daddy-month, which reserves one month of parental leave for the father,
was introduced in Sweden in 1995. We compare the behavior of fathers of
children born two weeks before and two weeks after the reform. The main
eect of this reform on fathers’ use of parental leave was that the share
of fathers taking zero days decreased from 54 to 18 percent and that the
number of fathers using around one month of parental leave increased from 9
to 47 percent. The fact that a large share of fathers took substantially more
parental leave in the latter group did not aect their share of care for sick
children, however.
The natural experiment approach used in this paper provides a very clean
test of the immediate eects of the reform. The daddy-month reform might
also have had eects that came into eect only gradually, if it for example
17lead to a gradual change in values held by parents or in the expectations
on mothers and fathers held by employers. We do not see any remarkable
c h a n g e si nt r e n d si nt h eu s eo fp a r e n t a ll e a v eo rc a r ef o rs i c kc h i l d r e nd u r i n g
the years after the reform. Unfortunately, it is, at least with our data, im-
possible to disentangle possible gradual changes from the reform from other
gradual changes, so we can not say anything about any gradual eects of the
reform with certainty.
The reasons for the unequal labor market outcomes between men and
women have received large attention from economists. We conclude by re-
lating our ﬁndings to this literature. A number of mechanisms producing an
unequal outcome have been oered. They do not necessarily conﬂict, in fact
they might reinforce each other if several of them are present. An under-
standing of the relative importance of the mechanisms is yet important from
a policy point of view, if policy makers aim at less inequality between men
and women. The mechanisms also have dierent welfare implications.
Specialization according to productivity provides an explanation for the
uneven outcome in the labor market, see Becker (1965, 1981). The specializa-
tion on housework of mothers due to care for newborns could have long-run
eects if there is a learning-by-doing investment in human capital for labor
market and household work. This specialization should be less pronounced
when fathers take more parental leave. We ﬁnd no support for the theory
of specialization according to productivity in the data, however it is very
strong from a theoretical point of view. Thus, we do not interpret the lack
of conﬁrmation of the theory as a refutation of the theory, but the absence
of any visible eects casts some doubt on the theory as a prime explanation
for the uneven division of housework and responsibility for children between
genders.
Using Swedish data, two papers have found fathers to suer a greater
loss in wages from parental leave than mothers (Staord and Sundström,
1996, Albrecht et al, 1999). This might be explained by fathers’ use of
parental leave being unexpected, and hence providing new information to
the employer. The daddy-month meant that many more fathers used at least
one month of parental leave and that the signal of taking one month becomes
less negative. The lack of changes in fathers’ share of care for sick children
is compatible with signaling. Fathers with children born immediately before
and after the reform will probably be evaluated in the same way if they are
absent due to care for a sick child.
Dierences in preferences between genders can cause specialization be-
tween genders in dierent types of work. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) analyze
the role of identity - "a person’s sense of self" as a source of dierences in
preferences. People engaging in activities that are not part of their identity
18suer a loss of utility. One of the cases discussed by Akerlof and Kranton is
male and female identities in the workplace. The daddy-month reform meant
that more fathers took one month of parental leave, which means that they
take some responsibility for child care, but the mother does still take most of
the responsibility. The daddy-month reform is unlikely to aect most fathers’
identities, since most fathers already agreed that they should take at least
some part of the responsibility for child care in a general sense. A reform
reserving half or more of the parental leave for men would probably be a
test of whether a change in the distribution of parental leave between fathers
a n dm o t h e r sc a na ect male and female identities, and if such a large change
would aect labor market outcomes, since it would probably conﬂict with
the identities of a large share of the population. The daddy-month reform
does not really test this theory, however.
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20Appendix.
Table 10: Number of Observations in Samples Three
Months before and after the Reform.
Sample Before After
O b sF r e q .O b sF r e q .
Children 24528 27619
Fathers 20814 84.9% 24978 90.4%
Mothers 24373 99.4% 27429 99.3%
Both parents 20659 84.2% 24788 89.7%
21Table 11: Mean Number of Children for a 20- and 10-day
Period at the Turn of Years.
Sample 12-31/12 21-31/12 1-20/1 1-10/1
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
1993-94 259.8 36.6 249.8 33.2 298.1 31.4 288.4 34.6
1994-95 263.7 29.8 259.0 35.8 280.0 35.5 275.6 42.4
1995-96 226.3 24.5 218.6 23.6 255.9 23.6 258.1 25.6
1996-97 217.3 26.5 208.3 24.5 243.9 27.4 247.9 22.6
1997-98 206.4 19.9 211.2 19.7 233.4 27.8 227.4 31.0
1998-99 200.9 21.9 197.3 24.7 230.9 24.4 230.0 30.3
1999-00 199.0 27.7 193.8 23.1 227.2 23.9 221.0 31.4
22Table 12: Distribution of Births by County, Before and
after the Reform.
County Before After
Obs Freq. Obs Freq.
Stockholm 848 22.9 826 21.2
Uppsala 136 3.7 144 3.7
Södermanland 127 3.4 108 2.8
Östergötland 149 4.0 202 5.2
Jönköping 125 3.4 151 3.9
Kronoberg 79 2.1 93 2.4
Kalmar 91 2.4 118 3.0
Gotland 21 0.6 22 0.6
Blekinge 57 1.5 58 1.5
Skåne 457 12.3 476 12.1
Halland 124 3.3 127 3.3
V:Götaland 607 16.9 579 17.5
Värmland 94 2.5 88 2.3
Örebro 110 3.0 110 2.8
Västmanland 125 3.4 118 3.0
Dalarna 100 2.7 112 2.9
G ä v l e b o r g 8 82 . 4 1 2 13 . 1
Västernorrland 93 2.5 81 2.1
Jämtland 46 1.2 50 1.3
Västerbotten 115 3.1 102 2.6
N o r r b o t t e n 9 72 . 6 1 1 02 . 8
Sum 3709 100.0 3892 100.0
23T a b l e1 3 :M e a no fP a r e n t a lL e a v eD a y si nS a m p l e sT h r e e
Months before and after the Reform.
Before After
Mean Std Mean Std Mean-Di T-stat
Sample: Three months before and after reform.
Fathers:
360-days 30.8 64.1 43.8 55.1 13.0 25.0
90-ﬂat 8.3 21.5 8.7 21.1 0.5 2.6
Mothers:
360-days 323.8 86.5 300.9 76.8 -22.9 -32.2
90-ﬂat 59.2 42.9 63.6 40.5 4.4 12.1
24